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 The topic of this research paper is the privatization of correctional facilities.  The 
purpose is to provide an understanding as to the benefits that may be derived from the 
privatization of either a new or existing correctional facility as well as attempting to 
educate law enforcement and correctional agency managers on some of the finer points 
of the legal issues that will need to be addressed in such an undertaking.  The 
importance of trying to understand this issue is that most governments do not have the 
financial means to fund for additional facilities that are to be used to incarcerate that 
government’s inmate population.  Therefore, the privatization of their existing facility or 
the building of a new facility that will be privately owned and operated may be a viable 
alternative.  The methodology used for this research includes the review of textbooks, 
periodicals, newspaper articles and a telephonic survey of both private correctional 
facility management and county and federal agency management that utilize private 
correctional facilities.  Without question, the findings determined that the privatization 
provides many benefits far outweighing any potential legal liability issues.  In addition, it 
was determined that in some instances when the local government did not house local 
inmates, the speculation that it would be used to house other types of inmates proved to 
be a financial plus for the local government.  Therefore, considering the fact that the 
local governments will continue to be under fiscal constraints, the privatization of 
correctional facilities is an extremely viable alternative. 
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 A recent press release issued by the United States Department of Justice 
determined that as of December 31, 2003, state and federal authorities held 1,470,045 
prisoners in custody.  This was a 2.1 percent increase from the previous year.  In 
comparing federal and state figures, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, which is the largest 
correctional system in the United States, had an increase of 5.8 percent while the state 
prison population had an increase of 1.6 percent. In addition, during 2003, the number 
of female inmates grew 3.6 percent, which was higher than the 2.0 percent increase in 
male population.  According to U.S. Prison Population (2004), as of December 31, 
2003, there were a total of 101,729 females under state or federal jurisdiction. 
Other significant items presented in the news release revealed that as of the end 
of 2003, state prisons were operating at their capacity to as much as 16 percent above 
capacity.  In comparison, the federal prison system was being operated at 39 percent 
above capacity.  During the same time frame, privately operated correctional facilities 
incarcerated 95,522 inmates.  These numbers accounted for 5.7 percent of the state 
inmate population and 12.6 percent of the federal inmate population.  According to U.S. 
Prison Population (2004), since the end of 2000, the number of federal inmates 
incarcerated in private facilities increased more than 40 percent, while the state inmate 
population incarcerated in private facilities decreased 1.8 percent. 
 As most of the members of the criminal justice community are aware, the United 
States incarcerates more people than any other industrialized nation.  Approximately 
800,000 persons are arrested for violent offenses, and 2.5 million more are arrested for 
serious property crimes each year.  It has been estimated that the need for prison beds 
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is growing at a rate of 1,000 per week (Pollack, 1997, p. 384).  A significant number of 
individual States were previously under or are currently under court mandate to reduce 
their respective inmate populations and improve prison conditions.  The United States 
spends in excess of $20 billion a year to ensure that facilities are available for inmates. 
As the United States continues to provide the resources in support of prison expansion, 
the taxpayers will have spent $10 billion dollars over the period of a few years to 
increase prison capacity by 170,000 new beds (Bryce, 1993, p. 7). 
 Over the course of the last fifteen years, private enterprise has made a 
tremendous impact in the area of privatizing correctional facilities.  These enterprises 
have been very successful due to their ability to finance, build and operate facilities 
either for their own benefit or for the benefit of federal, state and local governments. 
This success, however, has not come easy and the public should not assume that 
privatization efforts have always been successful. 
During the early stages of privatization, there were many questions that needed 
to be answered.  Several of these attempts to privatize have failed due to either the lack 
of experience and/or the lack of financial resources.  Bowman, Hakim & Siedenstat 
(1993) determined that in some of these instances, neither the private or government 
entities were able to meet the financial needs in order to be successful.  There was also 
the need to answer questions related to the benefits of privatization.  It was important to 
determine what the reaction of the taxpayer’s would be if a government was considering 
privatization in any form and points as they related to the legal issues of the delegation 
of authority, civil liability and the use of force. 
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Therefore, the issues to be examined by this paper were whether or not 
privatization of correctional institutions was a viable alternative for many of government 
entities which of course will significantly benefit the associated law enforcement and 
correctional agencies.   The purpose of this research was to identify the specific issues 
that originally concerned opponents of privatization and to show how, if at all, these 
issues were addressed. 
 The intended method of inquiry for this research project included: textbooks, 
periodicals, newspaper articles and a telephonic survey of both private correctional 
facility management and county and federal agency management that utilize a private 
correctional facility.  The intended outcome of this research paper is to provide an 
understanding of some of the benefits of privatization of correctional facilities and to 
educate the law enforcement and correctional agency managers on how some of the 
legal issues have been addressed.  The field of law enforcement that will most be 
affected by this research are law enforcement and correctional agency management 
who have an interest in understanding the benefits of the privatization of either their 
current or possible future correctional facility. 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE  
 Currently, only a few of the States are keeping pace with the demand for prison 
beds.  Other States are struggling with their efforts in dealing with the issue of their 
growing inmate populations.  As for the legislative entities, they continue to deal with the 
most violent offenders by passing laws requiring mandatory sentences or sentences 
that are administered without the possibility of parole as a response to the fear 
expressed by their citizens.  As previously identified, the States are operating over 
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capacity but are not dealing with the associated costs of the mandatory sentencing 
legislation. 
 On the federal government side of the issue, the Comprehensive Crime Control 
Act of 1984 and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 generated similar problems as those 
of the various State governments.  This federal legislation, along with other sentencing 
policies that were implemented, resulted in the placing of over 40,000 inmates in federal 
pre-trial detention.  Half of the 98 federal judicial districts were operating under “serious 
to critical space-availability” conditions, while 16 percent were operating under 
“emergency” conditions.  The United States Marshals Service is the federal agency that 
is responsible for assuming custody of defendants who are arrested by all other federal 
law enforcement agencies.  According to the Publication of the United States Marshals 
Service (2001), the Marshals Service assumes the responsibility for the housing and 
transportation of these individuals from the time they enter federal custody until their 
release or designation to the Federal Bureau of Prisons. 
 The Marshals Service receives approximately 140,000 prisoners on a yearly 
basis.  Each day the Marshals Service houses more than 35,000 of these prisoners in 
federal, state and local jails throughout the country.  Bryce (1993) reports that in order 
to house approximately 60 percent of this population, the Service contracts with 
approximately 2,000 state and local governments to rent space.  A number of these 
correctional facilities are privately owned and/or operated (US Marshal Publication, 
2000, p. 1).  
 In the Western District of Texas, which consists of 69 counties located from the 
western end of the state to central Texas, the Marshals Service averages a daily 
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prisoner population of 4,500 inmates.  Approximately 40 percent of this population is 
being housed in a facility which is either privately owned and/or operated (US Marshal 
Publication, 2004, p.1). 
 The history of other federal agencies turning to private facilities for the 
incarceration of adults actually began with federal initiatives back in 1979.  At that time, 
the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) contracted out some of 
its housing for illegal aliens prior to their deportation.  By 1986, one-fourth of the INS 
detainee population was being housed in private facilities.  In 1981, the Federal Bureau 
of Prisons (FBOP) began contracting out the housing of their pre-release detainee 
population to private operators.  As of 1986, the FBOP was contracting out the housing 
of over 3,000 inmates at 330 community treatment centers located throughout the 
country (McDonald, 1990, p. 25). 
 In the midst of this inmate population explosion is private industry, ready to take 
its business philosophies and accommodate the various governments.  Many 
governmental entities now turn to the private sector to obtain the needed assistance in 
obtaining housing services for the increased inmate population and to avoid any 
additional court orders that are mandating compliance to certain standards. 
 The opponents, however, see the influences of private industry as a process 
which will freely violate individual constitutional rights and obstruct due process and 
equal protections under the law.  Based on these opposing views, it is important to 
remember that private enterprise would not be in the business of operating prisons if it 
was not profitable to do so.  These private businesses would not consider large 
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investments of capital unless there was going to be a return on that investment (Pollack, 
1997, p. 385). 
These opponents are extremely concerned that the constitutional rights of 
inmates may be outweighed by the profit motive philosophy of the business.  It is 
believed that this will lead to financial shortcuts at the expense of inmates.  Some of the 
concerns that have been expressed against allowing the private sector to take over 
correctional duties include the government’s constitutional responsibility being 
delegated to a private enterprise; the State’s reluctance to accept liability in cases in 
which employees of a private corporation violate and deprive an inmate of his 
constitutional rights  while the inmate is in custody in a privately operated facility; and 
the use of force used by employees of a private corporation against inmates (Pollack, 
1997, p. 385). 
 For the most part, the managers of these private correctional facilities were 
extremely cooperative at providing detailed information as to the relationship between 
the companies they represent and the local governments.  Unfortunately, that was not 
necessarily the case with the response received from the local governments.  Some of 
the local government representatives did not return telephone calls.  The information 
obtained from the method of inquiry was used to supplement the information obtained 
from the other materials that were used in this research. 
Private business has not only invested in the build-to-operate-transfer agreement 
process, but they have also been paid over $200 million a year by state agencies for 
other services.  Many of these state agencies not only stated that the services received 
were extremely cost effective, but also that the agencies would not have been able to 
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provide them at a comparable cost.  Therefore, not only would these state agencies 
continue to use the contracting services, but they would look at expanding those 
services (Pollack, 1997, p. 389).  These types of experiences with private contracting 
have strongly suggested that governments can obtain the same level of services at a 
lower cost when provided by a private company. 
 Other forms of privatization for correctional services exist and are offered as 
three separate components which are construction, finance and operations. In the 
beginning of any new construction project, there is a process of design and construction 
that takes place.  During this process, it will be very important that representatives from 
both the government and private sector coordinate their efforts.  The second component 
will ultimately determine ownership.  While traditionally, jails are owned by 
governments, correctional facilities have remained under the ownership of private 
enterprise.  As part of the third component, no matter who ultimately has ownership, 
either public or private employees can staff, manage and operate the facility (McDonald, 
1990, p. 68). 
 As previously identified, prisons, jails, and detention centers have been built and 
owned by private firms and leased to governments in a number of different states.  It is 
possible to have on one side, the entire process of site and acquisition, design and 
construction being conducted by a private entity under a letter of intent from a 
government entity with the understanding that the government will be involved in the 
decision making process at every stage.  On the other side, the entire process can be 
conducted strictly by the private entity on speculation that a facility will be needed and 
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that the government will eventually sign an agreement to use the facility (McDonald, 
1990, p. 68). 
Various services such as medical and dental care, school programs, counseling, 
nursing homes, halfway houses, juvenile facilities, drug treatment facilities and alcohol 
treatment programs are currently being provided to state governments by private 
industry.  Many of these services are being provided within a prison environment. Local, 
state and federal governments have been using privately operated correctional facilities 
extensively since 1985.  Sixteen states have private facilities operating within their 
borders.  In Texas alone, there are approximately 28 privately run facilities (Pollack, 
1997, p. 390). 
 From other research conducted, the privatization planning process was 
described in six different stages which consisted of the agency’s decision whether to 
privatize; the establishment of specific goals; the organization of the system; analysis of 
the legal/liability issues; the preparation of the request for proposal (RFP); and the 
evaluation and control (Bowman, Hakim & Seidenstat, 1993, p. 3). 
 According to the source of information, one of the main motivations for a local 
government to privatize was to reduce costs while maintaining the quality of service.  A 
local government would need to consider the existing system’s cost estimates that 
include any direct costs of operating the agency, identify any hidden costs carried by 
other governmental agencies, and determine opportunity costs of the fixed inputs (e.g. 
land and physical facilities). 
All of these costs should then be compared with the computation approach that is 
being used by the private sector.  The result of all this information should provide a 
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maximum cost per each bed that the government would be willing to pay if it were to 
consider shifting financing, construction and management to the private sector. 
 In order to be successful at privatization, it will be very important to establish 
explicit goals and objectives and assign these issues relative weights.  The goals should 
reflect what the legislators and government officials wish the private company to attain 
and need and make it a part of the request for proposal (Bowman, Hakim & Seidenstat, 
1993, p. 3). 
The supporters of privatization have long held that private contractors have the 
advantage of being able to build facilities faster than any type of government 
construction.  This is definitely supported after a review of the bidding process that local 
governments are required to go through.  In addition, as part of these general 
procedures, the local government entities will be relying on the taxpayers to initially 
approve some type of bond action that will support payment of a specific project. 
During the planning stage, contractors will be requested to submit bids and a 
budget is then developed.  The bond will be voted upon when after all the issues about 
the bond are agreed to.  Since the process of reaching agreements on the bond and 
placing the project out to bid and starting construction on the project does not occur 
overnight, the cost of building will likely increase (Logan & Rausch, 1985, p. 313). 
In contrast, private corporations will generally have an identified list of contractors 
and are very familiar with the current costs of building a facility.  Instead of a bond issue, 
the private entity can enter into an agreement in which the costs of construction are 
deferred through a lease purchase agreement.  This agreement uses private financing 
to build and operate a correctional facility.  The government agency will then be 
10 
required to lease the prison and the private corporation will enter into a fee for service 
arrangement.  When the lease period ends, the government has the option of buying 
the facility from the builder at a reduced amount of the original costs, and will then be 
responsible to pay only existing operating costs (Logan & Rausch, 1985, p. 315). 
 From the federal perspective, when the FBOP and INS first began using private 
contractors, their ventures had some common factors.  Since the original scope of the 
contracting was kept to a small number of detainees, the private facilities were only 
housing a small fraction of the total population for which each agency was responsible 
for.  In addition, these agencies ensured that oversight was provided in the form of 
monitoring. 
The federal government decided to incorporate the ability to open and close 
these private facilities more quickly than if it had been a traditional institution because 
the respective federal populations increased and decreased frequently.  Based on the 
ability of the private sector to accommodate this, federal officials at both agencies 
reported that private operators offer many advantages such as speed and flexibility 
(McDonald, 1990, p. 26). 
 As previously identified, those opposed to privatization have an issue with 
allowing the government to delegate certain responsibilities to a private entity.  If one 
were to review the history of corrections, it will indicate that these governments at one 
time had no problem delegating some responsibilities to privately run correctional 
facilities such as contract labor in the form of chain gangs.  Many of these delegated 
responsibilities are no longer allowed because of lawsuits and court decisions, as well 
as the opinions that discourage state and private competition (Pollack, 1997, p. 391). 
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However, because governments in most cases do not have the necessary capital 
to continue to provide the entire realm of correctional services, the government has 
found itself in a position that it has no choice but to delegate these authorities over to 
the private sector.  In reviewing the specific services that have been delegated to the 
private contractors over the course of the last 50 years, there has not been one contract 
that has been found invalid by either the United States Supreme Court or any state 
Supreme Court.  Ironically, it was found that there is both statutory and case law in 
support of this delegation (Pollack, 1997, p. 392). 
In order to ensure that privatization of correctional facilities does not become a 
significant issue, many governments are making sure that laws are passed that grant 
the statutory authority needed that will allow the state to contract out for private bidding. 
The specific statutes that allow the government to delegate authority in the correctional 
area are known as enabling statutes.  As of the late 1990s, twenty-five states passed 
legislation that approved enabling statutes (Pollack, 1997, p. 392). 
 Other sources reviewed during this research identified additional concerns as 
they relate to inmate’s constitutional rights.  Specifically, the question being asked is 
which entity is responsible for the civil liability when the private entity is operating a 
correctional facility. 
Individual rights and constitutional guarantees for due process contained in the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments apply only to the acts of the government agency, not 
private industry.  The federal courts have applied one of three tests in determining if 
state action exists: 1) the public function test, 2) the close nexus test; and 3) the state 
12 
compulsion test.  It has been determined that the legal community has applied all three 
to a private prison scenario (Pollack, 1997, p. 393). 
 When a state government delegates a power that is traditionally and exclusively 
reserved for the State to a private entity, this is known as the public function test.  The 
close nexus-courts concept is more concerned with the type of relationship between the 
state and action that is being challenged and as to whether these actions can be 
distinguished from one another.  The state compulsion test requires a determination as 
to whether it is ultimately the obligation of the state. 
 There is a valid concern that states will try to avoid civil liability by the delegation 
of their authority to private entities.  The courts, however, have found that the “private 
entity must be considered to have acted under color of law, and its acts and omissions 
must be considered actions of the state” (Pollack, 1997, p. 394).  It is suggested that in 
order to avoid this scenario, any contract between the state and the private entity should 
include an indemnification agreement.  This agreement will require that the private 
business pay all costs associated with lawsuits arising out of the operation of the facility 
(Pollack, 1997, p. 395).  
 Other questions being asked was whether the private operator should be in the 
business of adjudicating charges against an inmate.  These charges would not be 
related to the charges the inmate would be in custody for, but related to any new 
violations that occur while the inmate is in the custody of the private operator. 
Additionally, will employees of the private corporation abuse the process of disciplinary 
hearings for violations that occur while in the facility and create charges in order to keep 
the inmates in custody for longer periods of time (McDonald, 1990, p. 34). 
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 In looking at both these questions, it was determined that there was more of a 
concern regarding the first issue.  While it is understood that maintaining discipline in a 
correctional institution is of vital importance, the task of allowing private employees to 
pass judgment on inmates is part of that process.  Obviously, if the violation is a serious 
one, the matter will need to be turned over to the judicial system that has jurisdiction 
over the matter (McDonald, 1990, p. 34). 
 The state will have a vested interest in retaining exclusive control over the power 
to order punishment.  It is felt that any delegation of this authority is an act of abdication 
that the state should not enter into.  In reviewing the response as to the second 
question, it was determined that this issue would be less problematic.  While it is 
possible that a private operator will abuse the disciplinary system in order to keep its 
inmate head count high, if the states are providing the necessary oversight and retains 
the power of judgment, the private operator’s ability to keep an inmate for a longer 
period of time will be limited (McDonald, 1990, p. 35). 
 As previously discussed, enabling statute legislation will be fundamental to the 
contracting process.  The statute will need to specifically address rules, regulations, 
licensing, policies and procedures directly involving the operation of any facility as well 
as designate the staff, facilities, budgets and responsible agencies for the oversight of 
those rules, regulations, licensing, policies and procedures. 
 These statutes will need to allow judges the authority to sentence defendants to 
private institutions.  Failure to do so would lead to a jurisdictional challenge of any 
sentence to a private prison.  Legal expertise should also be provided in the negotiating, 
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drafting and executing of all contracts in support of the operation of these facilities 
(Pollack, 1997, p. 395). 
Yet another significant issue that concerns the opponents of privatization is the 
use of force and the use of deadly force by employees of the private corporation.  Legal 
opinions have expressed that the same statutory authority that gives state employees 
the right to use force and deadly force can be slightly modified to authorize private 
correctional employees to use that force.  In order to facilitate this, it would be important 
to ensure that these private employees meet or exceed the same training requirements 
as those in a governmental facility (Pollack, 1997, p. 397). 
As it directly relates to the use of deadly force, research reviewed reached the 
conclusion that while the use of deadly force is a very significant one, it is unlikely that it 
will become an issue due in large part to the fact that detention officers seldom have a 
need to use deadly force (McDonald, 1990, p. 34).  According to the information 
presented, the idea of authorizing private employees to meet the same training 
requirements was taken a step further.  It was felt that states should consider 
designating private detention officers as peace officers only within the confines of the 
facility, while transporting prisoners and while pursuing escapees.  When considering 
peace officer status, this would require that these officers receive the same training as 
that provided to government detention officers (McDonald, 1990, p. 36). 
As for the procedures regarding the training, hiring and firing of private 
employees, these issues would need to be addressed during the initial contract 
negotiations.  If the private entities are to be liable for any constitutional violation, the 
failure of the private entity to provide the necessary training will be cause for them to be 
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liable.  The best way to deal with the use of force and use of deadly force issue by 
private correctional officers is to require these officers to be trained to the same level as 
government employees (Pollack, 1997, p. 397). 
METHODOLGY 
 With the United States incarcerating more inmates than any other industrialized 
nation consisting of approximately 800,000 defendants being arrested for violent 
offenses, and 2.5 million others being arrested for serious property crimes each year, 
will the federal, state and local jurisdictions have a sufficient number of prison beds 
available for this increasing population?  The hypothesis proposes to show that the 
privatization of existing facilities or the building of a new facility that will be privately 
owned and/or operated may be a viable alternative given that all potential concerns are 
addressed either through the solicitation process or the actual contract.  
 Considering that private enterprise has made a tremendous impact in the area of 
privatization of correctional facilities, will they continue to be a benefit to the federal, 
state and local governments?  Of significant concern to the taxpayers was whether the 
government agencies were also considering transferring liabilities based on issues 
related to the delegation of authority, civil liability and the use of force. 
 By logic alone, it can be perceived that the United States and other local 
jurisdictions might not have a choice but to rely on these private corporations to 
continue to provide alternatives means to finance, build and operate correctional 
facilities.  
 As a means to determine what the latest information on this subject is, research 
conducted included textbooks, periodicals, newspaper articles.  The specific method of 
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inquiry used was a telephonic survey. This survey included contacting not only 
operation managers working at existing private correctional facilities, but also contacting 
the respective county Sheriff or Chief Deputy of the county in which the private 
correctional facility was located.  The size and nature of the survey was limited to 
private correctional facilities and sheriff departments located in various parts of Texas 
and Southern New Mexico. The response rate for the survey was high due to the fact 
that these representatives were continuously contacted until a response could be 
obtained. 
FINDINGS 
 The significant arguments that have been raised in the continued debate over 
whether or not to privatize correctional facilities can be narrowed down to a few major 
areas of concern.  The telephonic survey that was conducted asked questions with 
respect to propriety, costs, quality, flexibility, security, liability, accountability and 
integrity. 
For the purposes of this survey, both private corporate managers and county 
managers (Sheriff’s department personnel) were contacted and asked to describe their 
general concerns relative to the areas previously listed.  These issues are being 
presented along with the most frequently encountered arguments which either oppose 
or favor privatization. 
Many public sector managers opposing privatization initially felt that the 
government did not have the legal ability to delegate their responsibility or authority to 
private sector entities as it related to the housing of inmates.  There was also the feeling 
of distrust that these private operators would place the priority of making money over 
17 
providing to the needs of inmates they were now responsible to house.  The local 
judicial system had a concern that they would lose authority over these inmates due to 
the fact that the inmates were now in the custody of a private contractor.  The final 
major concern was the loss of public servant jobs especially in instances in which an 
existing facility was transferred to a private contractor. 
The concern regarding the ability to delegate authority was quickly responded to 
by not only the courts, but also be numerous State Legislatures and Congress.  These 
governmental bureaucracies overwhelmingly supported, through statutory laws, the 
contracting of correctional institutions as being an essential service that a private 
contractor could perform. In addressing another legal matter, it was further determined 
that private contractors have no authority for sentence computations, classification or 
discipline of inmates without government oversight.  This would therefore eliminate the 
possibility that a contractor could regulate prison populations for profit gain. 
Those in favor of privatization felt that by contracting out, there would be a 
quicker response to demands for beds.  Contractors have the incentive to govern fairly 
and to lower costs.  Legally, both the public and private entities would be accountable 
for constitutional standards.   The need to monitor the contract would add an 
independent review. 
Those factions that were opposed to privatization had concerns that profit 
margins would be automatically added into contract costs.  There was also the potential 
for a contractor to submit a low-ball bid just to obtain the contract and then come back in 
and increase the costs of the original contract.  Many governmental managers were 
initially concerned about whether the contract would become more costly in the long 
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term and whether or not there would be a requirement for additional follow-on contracts 
that would need to be added at a later date. 
However, it was determined that the financing, site selections and construction 
could be done much quicker and at a lesser expensive by a private corporation than if 
the project was done by a government entity.  This primarily was due to the fact that 
private corporations weren’t encumbered by rigid procurement regulations.  The private 
companies were also able to produce more efficient designs. 
By allowing private contractors to bid, there was additional competition which 
helped not only to reduce the costs of construction, but also allowed for an increase in 
accountability by government workers and unions.  The government participants were 
able to reach agreements that would provide for either fixed fees or in some cases fees 
that were adjusted by the CPI.  It was also determined that a private contractor was able 
to hire a very effective personnel management team that would be able to offer 
incentive to its employees which would reduce not only sick leave but also overtime 
paid to those employees that would be covering those off sick. 
 The entities not favoring privatization as it relates to quality were concerned that 
the contractor’s work would be inferior primarily due to under-paid and under-trained 
staff.  In addition, they felt that the contractor would only agree to house non-
problematic inmates. 
By contracting out, it was determined that both the public and private sectors 
were motivated to compete.  The issue regarding under-trained staff was negated with 
contract stipulations that required employees of the private contractor to be trained to at 
least the same standard as those required by government employees.  In some cases, 
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studies demonstrated that the quality of the privately managed facilities were superior in 
selected areas.  In addition, by having the type and custody of inmates specified in the 
solicitation and contract, the contractor was required to house all inmates. 
Entities opposing privatization were concerned that a contractor would refuse any 
new elements in the statement of work without renegotiating the entire contract.  There 
was also the potential for the contract services to be disrupted by adverse public 
reaction, legal challenges, partisan politics or union activities.  This was believed to 
cause the contractor to refuse to cooperate with other public agencies. 
As it is turning out, by contracting, the process is allowing for greater flexibility by 
promoting innovation, experimentation, changes in programs as well as expansion or 
contraction of services offered by the contractor.  The governments have been able to 
avoid capital budget limits through leasing or by having the costs spread over time.  It 
has also reduced the level of bureaucracy in management decisions.  The process has 
also been able to circumvent civil service rules that may have otherwise interfered with 
good personnel management.  The flexibility of these contracts also promoted 
specialization which has helped deal with special needs offenders. 
Those against privatization felt that by using contractors, public and inmate 
safety would be jeopardized due to inadequate levels of staffing and training.  Others 
believed that the government’s ability to respond to emergencies at the facility would be 
limited.  These opponents also felt that by using private employees, there was a risk of 
not only a high employee turnover during the transition but of the potential for these 
employees to go on strike. 
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As it turned out, these concerns were easily addressed by having the contract 
dictate response parameters, staffing and training levels.  Clearly, the needs of that 
public organization in which private contractors may exceed what the public entity 
provides should be met.  In addition, it was determined that private employees were 
less likely to participate in a labor dispute because the contractor then becomes 
vulnerable to termination.  As the public sector has borne out, good security is the result 
of good management; therefore, as long as the private sector installed a responsible 
management, good security would occur. 
Of significant concern to opponents was whether the installation of a private 
entity would allow the government to evade liability.  Now in analyzing this concern, the 
public government members can possibly see this as a benefit.  But on the other hand, 
these opponents also were concerned about increased costs to the public by an 
increased exposure by acts of private employees which would obviously place the risk 
on the taxpayers. 
It has been shown that by contracting with private corporations, privatization has 
actually decreased the risks for which government remains liable.  The risks were 
decreased due to higher quality performance and indemnification by the contractor and 
contractually required insurance which was specified in the solicitation by the 
government. 
Concerns in this area primarily dealt with the potential in reduction in 
accountability of the private contractor especially if the contractor was insulated from the 
public and was not being subjected to political controls.  By contracting out it was felt 
that both the public and private entities would be able to diffuse responsibility for any 
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liability that has occurred and would potentially encourage the government to neglect or 
avoid its responsibility.  Then once the contract was in effect, opponents felt that there 
would be additional difficulty in the writing and enforcing of other contracts. 
As in other areas, it was determined that contracting actually has increased 
accountability because controls can easily be added to the entire process.  It became 
an easier process for the government to monitor and control a contractor than it was to 
do the same for themselves because the contractor usually specifies for a dedicated 
staff to perform only oversight functions.  The contractor also has the ability to promote 
and develop the use of objective performance measures for its employees.  Due to their 
nature, a contract facility generally becomes more visible and accountable in contrast to 
public operated prisons.  These contractors are forced to be more responsive to the 
attitudes and needs of local communities, especially when conducting site surveys for 
the location of a new prison.  
For the most part, the opponents for privatization were concerned with the 
potential for corruption (i.e. political spoils, conflicts of interest, bribes and kickbacks) 
between those involved in the decisions to privatize. 
 However, it has been found that contracting gives managers more of a vested 
interest in the reputation of the institution. Contracting promotes good management and 
practices which support integrity and ethics and because company reputation is so 
important, many companies devote more personnel to specifically address and 
investigate potential problems. 
 In summary, privatization limits up front government costs; allows for faster 
design, construction, and start up; costs savings; increased operational monitoring; 
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increased flexibility; competition is good and allows for new approached to business; 
decentralization; specialization when necessary; better accountability; and decreased 
liability exposure for the public entity. 
DISCUSSION/CONCLUSIONS 
 The fact that many state and local governments are being faced with 
overcrowding facilities should not come as a surprise.  With pressure from constituents, 
legislators continue to pass “get tough on crime” laws that are greatly contributing to the 
overcrowding.  Unfortunately, these same legislators are not working on legislation that 
will provide the much needed resources to allow law enforcement officials to implement 
these laws.  Correctional officials are being faced with the issue of releasing violent 
offenders prior to them having served a considerable portion of their sentences. 
In the federal system, officials are being forced to review cases and release drug 
offenders that were not sentenced pursuant to the mandatory guidelines so that less 
serious offenders who were sentenced pursuant to the guidelines can be housed. 
Governments are looking favorably on these private enterprises that are willing to 
finance, design, build and operate correctional facilities because of similar issues in 
both the federal and state systems (Pollack, 1997, p. 404). 
 As long as the public, as taxpayers, are unwilling to pay for the building of 
additional correctional facilities or, through legislation, deal with the unacceptable living 
conditions that currently exists at many prisons, allowing private business to step in may 
be the best option.  Especially when these private groups are able to finance, build and 
administer correctional facilities with continued success, there is also no room for the 
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public to place any pressures on legislators to investigate correctional policies, living 
conditions, and alternatives to incarceration (Pollack, 1997, p. 404). 
 With the options of allowing private correctional institutions to handle the day-to-
day activities of operations, governments can feel a sense of accomplishment, 
especially when the operation is cost effective.  However, the government cannot allow 
these private operators that much of a free-hand while operating a facility.  The 
government needs to ensure that it stays involved by providing extensive accountability 
and oversight.  Without any accountability and oversight, the private operation could 
revert to the oppressive ways of the early contracting processes.  
 Numerous criminologists feel that while the government may be in the position to 
delegate some of its correctional authority to private industry; it cannot delegate the 
responsibility for those that are incarcerated to anyone other than themselves.  In order 
for inmates to continue to receive constitutionally mandated treatment, these 
governments must remain accountable.  In addition, if inmates are to continue to have 
redress for any constitutional violations, the court system must remain accessible to 
them.  In order for these rights to remain intact, the government’s efforts at 
accountability and oversight must remain effective (Pollack, 1997, p. 405).  
 In order to make sure that the governments are able to be in a position to provide 
this accountability and oversight, they need to make sure that these concerns are 
addressed in any contract between the government entity and private operator.  By 
providing necessary clauses in these contracts, the government will be able to address 
issues related to indemnification agreements, performance bonds, review procedures 
and training criteria.  These factors will give the government the ability to provide the 
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necessary accountability and oversight to the extent that exceeds what is occurring in 
other government entities (Pollack, 1997, p. 406). 
 Based on the information reviewed, it appears that the businesses that have 
ventured into the privatization of correctional facilities for the most part are very 
successful, due in large part to the way they have marketed themselves.  Clearly, based 
on the politics of the local jurisdictions, they may not be wanted at all.  However, in most 
cases, communities sometimes even compete in an attempt to ensure that a 
correctional facility will be build within that community.  
 The researcher discovered how the building of a private facility in a poor county 
can do wonders for the local economy.  The number of additional jobs that are created 
and the number of persons that now have better paying jobs equates to more dollars 
being spent within the community.  Not only is it positive from an employee’s 
perspective, but many of these private corporations are making significant contributions 
to the community’s social programs.  
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Federal, State and private adult correctional facilities 
(by characteristics, 1995 and 2000) 
 
                Total                        Federal                    State                        Private                   
 
Facility Characteristics 1995  2000  1995  2000  1995  2000  1995  2000 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Number (a)   1,464  1,668    77    84  1,277  1,320   110   264 
 Confinement  1,160  1,208    75    84  1,056  1,023     29   101 
 Community-based    304     460      2      0     221     297     81   163 
 
Rated Capacity         975,719      1,278,471        64,500        83,113        891,826      1,090,225         19,294       105,133 
 
% of capacity occupied   105%     102% 125%  134%    104%     101%    86%            89% 
Security Level 
Maximum (b)     298     332      9    11    286     317       3       4 
Medium     463     522     25    29    432     428       6    665 
Minimum/Low    703     814     43    44    559     575    101    195 
Size (c) 
Fewer than 100 inmates   325     357       2      0    239       22     84    132 
100 to 249     290     289       2      2    279     244       9      43 
250 to 749     349     360     20    10    317     304     12      46 
750 to 1,499     345     421     41    49    299     339       5      33 
1,500 to 2,499     100     176     10    22      90     144       0      10 
2,500 or more      55       65       2      1      53       64       0        0 
 
Note: a) Classification of federal facilities changed between 1995 and 2000 with 38 camp facilities being administratively merged with 36 
confinement facilities and the reclassification of 12 facilities as private; b) Includes facilities with the security designations super maximum, 
close and high; c) Based on average daily population , July 1, 1999 to June 30, 2000. 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Justice 





Private adult correctional facility management firms 
(by capacity of facilities under contract, 1997 and 2001) 
 
                                    Capacity of all facilities under contract (a)                                    
 
Management firm      1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Alternative Programs, Inc.      340   340   340   340   340 
Avalon Correctional Services, Inc. (b)    150   350   350   350   710 
The Bobby Ross Group              2,825   464   464   464   464 
CiviGenics, Inc.               3,563           3,563           2,791           2,795            2,243 
Cornell Corrections, Inc.              3,882           5,916           7,138           8,464           8,424 
Correctional Services Corporation             2,629           6,891           6,517           4,241           3,891 
Correctional Systems, Inc.      170   272   272   272   272 
Corrections Corporation of America           50,866         67,286         68,256         62,431         62,231 
Dominion Correctional Services, Inc.     NA    NA    NA           2,064           2,064 
The GRW Corporation      362   362   362   614   614 
Management & Training Corporation            4,259           6,447           9,177         10,214         10,566 
Maranatha Production Company     500   500   500   500   500 
U.S. Corrections Corporation              5,259    NA   NA   NA   NA 
Wackenhut Corrections Corporation (c)          22,257         24,541         26,704         26,704         26,704 
 
Total               97,062       116,932       122,871       119,453       119,023 
 
Note: a) Includes operation facilities, facilities under construction, and planned expansions of existing facilities; b) Formerly Avalon 
Community Services, Inc.; c) Wackenhut Corrections Corporation did not respond to the survey and the date was estimated by the Source. 
 
Source: Private Adult Correctional Facility Census 
Center for Studies in Criminology and Law, 2002 
 
